For years, one of the biggest questions surrounding the October 7 massacre has been how Israel — with one of the most sophisticated intelligence systems in the world — could have been taken so completely by surprise.
The more that has emerged since then, the harder I find it to accept the official explanations.
I am not saying that, at the time of writing, it has been proven that Benjamin Netanyahu knew the exact date, time and details of the Hamas attack. It has not.
But I do believe there is a important unanswered questions about what warnings reached his office and how the government responded.
The warnings before October 7
In September 2026, Haaretz reported that UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed had warned Netanyahu roughly ten days before October 7 about Hamas preparing a major operation.
Netanyahu’s office denies that such a warning was given.
Then came reporting from The Atlantic that Egyptian intelligence chief Abbas Kamel secretly flew to Israel on September 26, 2023 — eleven days before the attack — to warn senior Israeli officials about signs of a large Hamas operation.
According to the report, the warning did not contain the exact date or full details of the attack.
But that is not really the point.
Intelligence warnings are rarely delivered as perfect predictions. The whole purpose of intelligence is to piece together incomplete information and act before disaster happens.
If several serious warnings were reaching Israel shortly before October 7, then the question becomes obvious:
What did Netanyahu know, and why was Israel so unprepared?
I think there may be an even darker explanation
My own suspicion goes further than simple incompetence.
A crucial unanswered question is whether senior officials understood the seriousness of the threat and failed to take adequate precautions. The reporting cited here does not establish deliberate inaction.
Why?
Because October 7 gave his government the “justification” for the enormous military campaign in Gaza that followed.
It also transformed Netanyahu from a deeply embattled prime minister into a wartime leader at a time when he was already facing an ongoing corruption trial and enormous domestic political pressure. By keeping Israel in a constant state of war, he may be able to delay or complicate his corruption trial.
To be clear: the reporting discussed here does not establish that Netanyahu personally knew the details of the attack beforehand.
There is currently no evidence establishing that Netanyahu deliberately allowed October 7 to happen, at least not that has been released to the public.
But I do not think the possibility should simply be dismissed as too terrible to consider.
If a leader knowingly allowed a foreseeable attack on his own population because he believed the consequences would serve his political or personal interests, that would constitute an extraordinarily grave abuse of power.
That is exactly why the question deserves a genuinely independent investigation.
Netanyahu is delaying his trial
Netanyahu was already on trial before October 7, facing charges of bribery, fraud and breach of trust, which he denies.
The war did not prevent the trial from starting.
But prolonged war and repeated national-security emergencies have complicated and delayed parts of the proceedings.
That does not prove motive.
But it does mean Netanyahu had obvious political reasons to benefit from remaining in power during a prolonged security crisis.
For me, that makes the unanswered questions surrounding the warnings before October 7 even more important.
What needs to be established
A proper investigation should answer some very basic questions:
What warnings came from Egypt?
What warnings came from the UAE?
What did Israeli intelligence know?
What information reached Netanyahu personally?
And most importantly:
Were the warnings simply misunderstood, or were they consciously ignored?
There is a huge difference between catastrophic incompetence and deliberate inaction.
At the moment, we do not know which explanation is closer to the truth.
But I believe the unanswered questions about what warnings reached Israel’s leadership, how they were assessed and why more was not done deserve far more scrutiny than they have received.
The question is no longer only how Hamas managed to attack Israel.
It is also:
How much did Israel’s leadership know before October 7, and why was more not done to prevent it?
Related reading: Will Israel Change if Netanyahu Loses the Election? and Gaza From Above: A Failure of Humanity.